disproportionate to the severity of the crime[s] warranting imprisonment." 8 In its deference to state penal practices, Rhodes also reiterated the Court's strong admonition in Bell v. Wofish 9 that federal courts should not take an active role in effectuating improvements in state prisons. Thus, with Rhodes, the Court effectively undermined federal court leadership in pressing for improvements in state prisons across the country.
II. BACKGROUND: OVERCROWDING AND EXTENSIVE JUDICIAL INVOLVEMENT IN PRISON MATTERS
The Court heard the Rhodes case "because of the importance of the question to prison administration."
10 At stake was nothing less than control over the administration of state prisons. Because conditions at SOCF had not yet significantly deteriorated due to overcrowding, a decision in favor of the inmates would have effectively established a constitutional minimum space requirement of approximately sixty square feet per inmate. Implementing this standard would have required state expenditures of up to ten billion dollars for prison construction. II Alternatively, states could have ameliorated prison overcrowding by redefining criminal activity or by altering their sentencing, parole and penal practices. 1 2 Since the federal courts would likely be forced to oversee the implementation of the per inmate space standard, a decision in favor of the inmates would have led to increased federal court reliance on the sweeping and detailed "institutional remedies" which have characterized prison condition litigation.1 3 In short, in Rhodes the Court was simply unwilling to risk a near certain multi-billion dollar confrontation with state legislatures, and reluctant to set a strong precedent for active federal court scrutiny of general conditions in other institutions. Federal courts traditionally maintained a "hands off" approach to- 19 1 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 14. 20 2 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 4-5. The sources of uncertainty in forecasting prison population include inadequate data, random fluctuations in prison populations, and changes in criminal justice policy which affect the flow of people to and from penal institutions.
the 1971-1977 period, 2 1 population gains in many state prisons outpaced the construction of new facilities. The Texas prison population, for example, nearly doubled between 1968 and 1978 while its prison capacity increased by only thirty percent. 22 All of the advisory bodies setting prison space standards have concluded that each inmate needs at least sixty square feet of space, preferably in a single cell, in order to prevent mental and physical deterioration. 23 26 The study found that the rates of death, suicide and disciplinary infractions rose substantially faster than population increases in the Texas prison system. 2 7 Conversely, when the population of the Oklahoma system dropped, there was an even greater decline in the violent death rate. 28 "Double ceiling," the housing of two inmates in a cell designed for one, is a common response to prison population increases. The study found that double celling has "measurably greater negative effects than single unit housing." 3 0 It also revealed that large penal institutions, including those the size of SOCF, produce more negative effects than smaller prisons. tween the table and toilet, table and bed, or cell door and bed, all of which are normally  inaccessible, and, therefore, constructively unusuable. A prisoner who is 5 feet 5 inches tall, standing in the center of his cell (facing the entrance) can extend his arms, and with no effort, touch both walls over the bed and desk. A prisoner who is 6 feet tall or more will have to bend his arms at the elbows to accomplish the same task. It takes little imagination to understanding the devastating effect of double ceiling. 24 Id at 61. In 1978, 19 percent of state cells and 11 percent of federal cells were occupied by two or more inmates. Three or more inmates were housed in over 3,000 "single" cells, primarily in state prisons. Id at 59. 25 3 AMERICAN PRISONS, supra note 17, at 57. Using the capacity of individual confinement cells as reported by the states, the utilization rate was 94 percent. When capacity is defined as one inmate per cell of any size or, for dormitories, the smaller of 60 square feet per inmate of the capacity as rated by the state, the utilization figure is 114 percent. 30 EFFECT OF OVERCROWDING, supra note 22, at 125. Differences were observed in illness complaint rates, tolerance of overcrowding, nonviolent disciplinary infractions, mood states, rating of the institutional environment and perceptions of personal choice and control. Id 31 Id at 129. The study compared institutions with approximately 1,500 inmates with those holding about 1,000 inmates. The large'institutions had higher death rates (both violent and non-violent) and disproportionately more suicides, psychiatric commitments, selfmutilations and attempted suicides. SOCF has a design capacity of about 1,660, and, at the Overcrowding has been a major issue in most cases challenging general prison conditions. 32 By increasing pressure on physical facilities and staff, overcrowding is often the source of a variety of prison problems, including breakdowns in sanitation, security, medical care and rehabilitative services. 33 In their remedial orders, lower federal courts have curbed overcrowding by forbidding double celling in cells ranging from thirty-five to eighty-eight square feet in size. 34 In reaching their decisions, they have relied extensively upon the per inmate space minimums established by the assorted prison advisory groups. The relief ... will require many changes in TDC's operations. TDC will be obliged, inter alia, to reduce the inmate population at each unit, to increase the security and support staff, to furnish adequate medical and mental health care, and to bring all living and working environments into compliance with state health and safety standards. Its officials will be charged with the duty of instituting, performing and supervising practices that will extirpate and abate staff brutality, the use of building tenders, abuse of the disciplinary process, and further violation of the inmates' rights to access to the courts. Achievement of all these tasks-will be extremely difficult even under the best of circumstances, and it may be anticipated that elimination of some of the long-standing practices will be particularly troublesome. The record clearly manifests that the necessary changes cannot be effectuated under TDC's existing organizational structure. has a superior law library as well as school facilities, workshops, a forty bed hospital and outdoor recreational and visitation areas. 4 2 Its cells are approximately sixty-three square feet in size. 43 In addition to a bed (or bunk beds if double celled) occupying twenty square feet, each cell contains a cabinet type night stand, wall cabinet, shelf, wall mounted lavatory with hot and cold running water, commode flushed from inside the cell, and a radio and ventilation duct. 44 Each cell block contains a dayroom "designed to furnish that type of recreation or occupation which an ordinary citizen would seek in his living room or den. ' 45 At the time of trial, SOCF housed 2,300 inmates, thirty-eight percent over its design capacity. 46 Sixty-seven percent of the inmates were serving either life or first degree felony sentences. 47 Approximately 1,400 inmates were doubled celled. 48 About seventy-five percent of the double celled inmates were permitted to leave their cells for about fifteen hours daily and go to the dayroom or participate in prison activities.
9
The district court found that double ceiling had not overtaxed SOCF's physical facilities or staff. Its food, ventilation and noise levels were acceptable and double celling had not significantly reduced inmate access to the dayrooms, visitation facilities, law library or school programs. 50 Nor were plaintiffs able to establish that there had been an increase in inmate violence and criminal activity which could be attributed to double celling.
1
The district court did find that prison jobs had been "watered down" by assigning more inmates than were necessary to each job. 52 While there was evidence of inappropriate medical treatment and iso- [Vol. 72
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lated instances of failure to provide medical attention, the situation was not "out-of-hand or the result of indifference. ' 53 As a result of overcrowding, however, SOCF inmates were substantially deprived of psychological services.
4
Despite these generally favorable findings, the district court held that the "totality of circumstances" at SOCF made double celling unconstitutional. 55 It identified five important factors. First, the inmates' long sentences exacerbated the problems of close confinement and overcrowding. 56 Second, SOCF held thirty-eight percent more inmates than its rated capacity and such "overcrowding necessarily involves excess limitation of general movement as well as physical and mental injury from long exposure." ' 57 Third, the cells were built to house one person and in light of recommended prison space guidelines, the space alloted to each double celled inmate was insufficient 58 Fourth, double celled inmates spent most o their time in their cells and a significant number of these inmates were locked in their cells with their cellmates for over twenty-three hours daily. 5 9 Fifth, double ceiling was not a temporary expedient, which would have been "undoubtedly permissible," but instead seemed destined to become a regular practice.
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In an unpublished opinion, the Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's decision. 6 1 It disagreed with the petitioner's argument that the lower court's decision had made double celling unconstitutional per se. The Sixth Circuit ruled that the district court's findings were not clearly erroneous, its conclusions of law were permissible, and its remedy reasonable. 62 The Supreme Court's understanding of the district court's decision as making double ceiling unconstitutional per se probably prompted it to grant certiorari. IV. THE SUPREME COURT REVERSES In a decision written by Justice Powell, the Supreme Court reversed the lower courts' holdings.64 While the Court never explicitly adopted an eighth amendment test, it limited its inquiry to whether conditions at SOCF wantonly and unnecessarily inflict pain or are grossly disproportionate to the severity of the crimes warranting imprisonment. 65 Prison conditions which are neither excessive nor disproportionate under contemporary standards are not unconstitutional and "to the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society."
Applying this eighth amendment interpretation to the conditions at SOCF, the Court stressed that double celling had not deprived inmates of food, medical care or adequate sanitation, nor led to a disproportionate increase in prison violence. 6 7 A marginal diminution in work and educational programs was, according to the Court, far from a deprivation of constitutional dimension. 68 The Court also dismissed the five considerations relied upon by the district court in finding double celling unconstitutional as "fall[ing] far short in themselves of proving cruel and unusual punishment. ' 69 The Court concluded its eighth amendment analysis by stating that "the Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons" and that the problems of double celling at SOCF should be "weighed by the legislature and prison administration rather than a court. ' ' 70 In the final portion of the opinion, the Court discouraged judicial activism in the area of prison conditions by warning that "courts cannot assume that state legislatures and prison officials are insensitive to the requirements of the Constitution or to the perplexing sociological problems of how best to achieve the goals of the penal function in the criminal justice system .... ,,71
In a concurring opinion joined by Justices Blackmun and Stevens, Justice Brennan emphasized that "today's decision should in no way be construed as a retreat from careful judicial scrutiny of prison conditions." ' 72 Justice Brennan began by discussing the factors which have led to the emergence of the federal courts as the "critical force" behind the amelioration of inhumane prison conditions. Among these factors are the lag in correctional expenditures behind rising prison populations, public apathy, the political powerlessness of prisoners, and the refusal of state legislatures to allocate sufficient money to raise prison conditions to minimally adequate levels. 73 Justice Brennan's eighth amendment analysis differed from the majority's. He believed that the Court should question whether prison conditions comport with "human dignity." ' 74 Noting that poor prison conditions often arise from neglect rather than policy, Justice Brennan argued that "there is no reason of comity, judicial restraint, or recognition of expertise for courts to defer to negligent omissions of officials who lack the resources or motivation to operate prisons within limits of decency."
' 75 Outlining and then applying a totality of the circumstances test, 76 Justice Brennan described SOCF as "one of the better, more humane large prisons. ' 77 Rejecting a view that double celling is per se unconstitutional, Justice Brennan concluded that absent any "actual signs" that double celling has seriously harmed SOCF inmates the practice is not unconstitutional. 78 Justice Blackmun, who joined in Justice Brennan's concurrence and wrote a separate concurring opinion, said that the majority opinion should not be read as marking a retreat from federal court scrutiny of state prison conditions.
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Justice Marshall, the only dissenter, argued that double celling did not result from a considered legislative policy judgment, but simply because more individuals were sent to SOCF than it was designed to hold. 80 According to Justice Marshall, the relevant legislative. policy judgment was the initial decision during the design of the facility to provide each inmate with his own cell. 8 ' Pointing to unanimous and undisputed expert testimony that double celling is undesirable, 82 and to the district court's finding that long-term double celling necessarily causes mental and physical deterioration, 83 Justice Marshall concluded that the conditions at SOCF violate eighth amendment norms. 8 4 In the final portion of his dissent, Justice Marshall expressed his fear that the majority opinion will "eviscerate" the federal courts' role in actively re-viewing state prison conditions. 8 5 Warning that the majority has taken "far too sanguine a view of the motivations of state legislators and prison officials," Justice Marshall argued that a strong federal court presence is especially needed because "[i]n the current climate it is unrealistic to expect legislators to care whether the prisons are overcrowded or harmful to inmate health." 8 6
V. EIGHTH AMENDMENT INTERPRETATION A. RHODES UTILIZES A NARROW EIGHTH AMENDMENT ANALYSIS
Rhodes marks the first time that the Court has considered the restrictions which the eighth amendment places upon conditions at state prisons. 8 7 The Court's narrow interpretation of the amendment in the decision exemplifies its restrictive reading of the "cruel and unusual punishment" clause in recent cases. It precludes an assertive role by the judiciary in defining and protecting standards of human decency and dignity in the context of confinement.
Three general applications of the eighth amendment can be identified. Originally, the prohibition against cruel and unusual punishments. Rhodes was decided during a period of conservative dominance in the executive and legislative branches of the federal government. The conservatism was illustrated by the massive transfer of federal funds from social welfare programs to the military and a tax cut benefiting primarily taxpayers in upper-income brackets which were engineered by the Reagan administration in the spring and summer of 1981. The conservative fervor and hi-partisan support for the cuts in social programs must have been an important signal to the Court to avoid forcing billions in governmental expenditures or innovative penal reforms in order to reduce prison overcrowding. 93 It stayed the imposition of the cadena temporal, a sentence of twelve years at hard and painful labor with permanent loss of civil rights, upon an individual who had falsified public records. 94 Weems was also the precursor of a third application of the eighth amendment. Explaining its expansion of the eighth amendment to cover disproportionate punishment, the Court noted that "time works changes, brings into existence new conditions and purposes;
[t]herefore, a principle to be vital must be capable of wider application than the mischief which gave it birth. ' 95 The eighth amendment "is not fastened to the obsolete but may acquire meaning as public opinion becomes enlightened by a humane justice. '9 6 The notion that the eighth amendment incorporates advancing standards of a "humane justice" was elevated into a distinct mode of eighth amendment analysis fifty years later in Trop v. Dulles. 97 Forbidding the denaturalization of an individual who had briefly deserted the army, the Court stated that "the basic concept underlying the eighth amendment is nothing less than the dignity of man, [w]hile the State has the power to punish, the Amendment stands to assure that this power be exercised within the limits of civilized standards." 9 8 The Court went on to observe that the scope of the eighth amendment is not static and "must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that mark the progress of a maturing society." 99 The central problem for eighth amendment analysis since Trop has been whether "evolving standards of decency" and the "dignity of man" constitute a distinct constitutional "test" or whether this language simply means that the definitions of cruelty and disproportionality may change over time. Those justices who discern a separate "decency" standard in the eighth amendment favor the judiciary's taking a leading role in defining and advancing such "public values." 1°° On the other hand, those justices who would largely confine the eighth amendment to its two traditional applications envision a much more limited role for the courts in mandating changes in state practices in the interest of "subjective" notions of human dignity and decency. This ideological split is especially evident in Furman v. Georgia, 1°1 where the Court struck down a state death penalty statute. None of the justices disputed the two traditional applications of the eighth amendment. The source of their disagreement was the extent to which the Court should use the amendment to make an independent and critical analysis of the morality and efficacy of state punitive practices. Justice Brennan viewed the eighth amendment as prohibiting "uncivilized and inhumane punishments." ' 1 0 2 A state "must treat its members with respect for their intrinsic worth as human beings" and its punishments "must comport with human dignity."' 1 0 3 Advocating active judicial review of state imposed punishments, Justice Brennan defined a punishment to be in violation of the eighth amendment when "there is a significantly less severe punishment adequate to achieve the purposes for which the punishment is inflicted." 104 Maintaining that standards of decency had advanced, Justices Brennan 1 0 5 and Marshall 0 6 found the death penalty unconstitutional per se.
At the other end of the ideological spectrum, Justice Powell found in the eighth amendment "no support . . . for the view that the court may invalidate a category of penalties because we deem less severe ones adequate to serve the ends of penology."' 0 7 In his dissenting opinion, Chief Justice Burger explicitly rejected judicial use of standards of decency as a distinct eighth amendment test by stating that "in a democand operational content to ambiguous constitutional values such as liberty, equality, due process and freedom from cruel and unusual punishment and in setting priorities when such values conflict, see Fiss, Forward-The Fons ofJustice, 93 HARV. L. REv. 1 (1979). Fiss does not advocate, however, that the judiciary become the final arbiter of public values: "Judges have no monopoly on the task of giving meaning to the public values of the Constitution, but neither is there reason for them to be silent. They too can make a contribution to public debate and inquiry." Id at 2. In his article, Fiss outlines how structural reform of state institutions by the courts has been a primary forum for judicial enunciation of public values.
1I [Vol. 72 racy the legislative judgment is presumed to embody the basic standards of decency prevailing in society." 10 8 Thus, he argued that the death penalty statute was constitutionally acceptable, even though expressing grave doubts as to its efficacy and morality. 1 0 9
Since Furman, the more limited interpretation of the eighth amendment has prevailed and "standards of decency" no longer constitute an independently viable eighth amendment norm. In Gregg v. Georgia, 1 10 another death penalty challenge, the Court rejected close judicial evaluation of the efficacy or decency of legislatively imposed punishments. Limiting the eighth amendment to its two traditional applications, the Court stated that the judiciary was "not to require the legislature to select the least severe penalty possible so long as the penalty selected is not cruelly inhumane or disproportionate to the crime involved." 1 1
In Ingraham v. Wnght' 1 2 the Court declined to extend the eighth amendment to cover school disciplinary practices, limiting the scope of its protection to convicted criminals.'" 3 Importantly, the Court rejected the petitioner's argument that the eighth amendment should be expanded because standards of decency had advanced" 1 4 and social institutions had changed significantly since its adoption. 1 1 5 In dictum, the Court narrowly limited the applicability of the eighth amendment to prisoners, remarking that "the protection afforded [prisoners] by the Eighth Amendment is limited. After incarceration only the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain constitutes cruel and unusual punishment."' 1 6
The Court's reluctance to utilize a separate decency standard is further illustrated by Rummel v. Estelle 117 where the Court upheld the imposition of an automatic life sentence under a state recividist statute on an individual whose three thefts did not involve violence and netted less than $230. The Court rejected Rummel's argument that due to the pet-108 Id at 384. The Chief Justice also observed that: "[U]p to now the Court has never actually held that a punishment has become impermissibly cruel due to a shift in the weight of accepted social values; nor has the Court suggested judicially manageable criteria for measuring such a shift in moral concerns." Id at 382-83. 
1981]
tiness of the crimes, the sentence was disproportionate, stating that such an analysis would embroil the Court in "subjective" decision-making which was better left to the legislature." 8 Rummd reveals the Court's disenchantment not only with playing an active role in discerning and shaping contemporary standards of decency but also with the very notion that eighth amendment standards "evolve" rather than merely change:
Perhaps, as asserted in Weems "time works changes" upon the Eighth Amendment, bringing into existence 'new conditions and purposes." We all, of course, would like to think that we are "moving down the road toward human decency." Within the confines of this judicial proceeding, however, we have no way of knowing in which direction that road lies. 119 In Rhodes, the Court embraced only the two traditional applications of the eighth amendment, simply requiring that prison conditions be neither unnecessarily cruel nor disproportionate to the inmates' crimes. 120 Its holding that double celling at SOCF is not unconstitutional easily followed from this approach. First, the Court did not question the State's penological justification, if any, for the double celling. 121 Second, it neither considered the long-term effects of double celling on SOCF's inmates, staff and facilities nor weighed any dignity or privacy interests which the inmates may have. 122 Third, given SOCF's status as a first-class facility which had not yet deteriorated due to overcrowding, the Court concluded that inmates were not deprived of a "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities."' 123 Finally, since most of the SOCF inmates were serious offenders, even conditions that were especially "restrictive, even harsh" would have passed constitutional muster. 
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B. TWO WEAKNESSES IN RHODES' EIGHTH AMENDMENT APPROACH
One weakness in Rhodes' eighth amendment approach is that it inadequately accounts for the political dynamics which make it difficult, if not nearly impossible for many states to operate humane prisons. 25 Prisoners are not only disenfranchised but are disproportionately from minority groups and the poor; social groups with little political influence. 126 At best, the general public is unaware of the nature of prison conditions. 27 Prior to about 1965 the people of Arkansas as a whole knew little or nothing about their penal system although there were sporadic and sensational "exposes" from time to time about alleged conditions at the [prison] farms. These "exposes" created little, if any, lasting impression on the Arkansas public. As of that time it is probably fair to say that many otherwise well informed Arkansas people viewed the Penitentiary as a self-sustaining, even profit making institution, operated by a few strong-willed men who were able to make the convicts behave themselves and work. ous indifference. 28 Given the high costs of constructing and operating prisons, 29 I40 Since federal courts would play the major role in implementing a minimum space standard, a decision for the SOCF inmates would have substantially increased the power of the federal judiciary vis-a-vis state legislatures and prison administrators. This would come at a time when the "states rights" doctrine is resurgent 4 and the Congress is considering major limits on the Court's jurisdiction in other controversial areas like school desegregation and abortion. 142 Given these investigation and subsequent trial of prison employees and some former employees and inmates. Only one person was convicted of violating the inmates' civil rights.). practical considerations, the result in Rhodes is not unexpected, especially since the conditions at SOCF were relatively good.1 43 The price of the majority's deference to the states, however, is likely to be poorer prison conditions for many inmates.
Another weakness is that Rhodes' eighth amendment analysis does not include consideration of the long-term deleterious effects of double ceiling. The Court declined to consider the possibility that long-term overcrowding creates a dangerous potential for frustration and violence which could lead to a prison riot.' 4 4 With overcrowding recognized as a cause of mental and physical deterioration of inmates 45 and as a major source of prison disorders 46 one consequence of this approach may be the unchecked rise in state prison populations to explosive levels. Given the demonstated inability of legislatures in many states to maintain even marginally adequate facilities,' 4 7 Rhodes did not transfer responsibility for improving prison conditions from the federal courts to the states. Rather, the decision effectively dissipated this responsibility.
One of the most interesting aspects of Rhodes is its failure to utilize as the eighth amendment norm the prison space standards which have been set by a variety of oversight organizations. The Court declined to accord constitutional significance to these standards, considering them only organizational "goals" which "cannot weigh as heavily in determining contemporary standards of decency as 'the public attitude toward a given sanction.'"148 In contrast, lower courts have relied extensively on these standards when finding and remedying overcrowded conditions. 149 This rejection of well-established professional standards stems from the Court foregoing, as part of its narrow interpretation of the eighth amendment any independent analysis of the penological justification for state prison conditions as part of its narrow interpretation of the eighth amendment. One fundamental problem with this approach is the Court's tendency to rely on legislative enactments or administrative practices as embodying contemporary stan-dards of cruelty, disproportionality and decency. 150 Prison conditions cases, however, present a strong prima facie case for the use of professional standards as the eighth amendment norm. First, there is a strong concensus among experts that less than fifty or sixty square feet of space per inmate is harmful.151 Second, since relatively low numbers of middle and upper class whites are incarcerated, the most politically and intellectually influential sectors of the public are 151 And in Rhodes, "The experts were all in agreement-as is everybody-that single ceiling is desirable." 434 F. Supp. 1007 Supp. , 1016 . Compare this unanimity with the situation in Rummel v. Estelle, 445 U.S. at 263-83, where the Court notes the disagreement among penologists as to proper sentencing as an element in its decision not to stop the application of a state recidivist statute on eighth amendment grounds. 152 See, e.g., 2 OFFENDER RIGHTS LITIGATION, supra note 128: " [F] or most whites, the prison remains a strange and unfamiliar phenomenon, at the periphery of our lives. Relatively few whites go to prison or jail. . . For black and latino people, however, the prison is more than a metaphor and it is a pervasive element of life in the ghetto." Id at 7. In sum, Rhodes exemplifies the Court's unwillingness to employ a distinct eighth amendment inquiry on the basis of public values like decency and dignity. Its narrow eighth amendment approach de-emphasized the importance of the dependency relationship between inmates and prison officials, ignored the political factors which block prison reforms, and rejected "objective indicia"' 5 7 which establish that double celling is harmful. The importance of the decision is that it established a mode of eighth amendment analysis that is intrinsically much less sympathetic to the claims of inmates than that which has heretofore been employed by the lower federal courts.
C. LESS CRITICAL SCRUTINY OF STATE PENAL PRACTICES
While Rhodes marks the first time that the Court has applied the eighth amendment to prison conditions, 58 it has recently considered several constitutional challenges to specific prison practices.1 59 These cases have been important in establishing the degree of deference which the federal courts are to accord state operation of prisons. In a 1974 case, Procunier v. Martinez, 160 the Court held that mail censorship regulations in California prisons violated the first amendment and that a ban on law student and paralegal interviewers infringed upon the inmates' due process right of access to the courts. In an often quoted section of the opinion, the Court discussed the limits on the oversight role of the courts in prison administration: Suffice it to say that the problems of prisons in America are complex and intractable, and, more to the point, they are not readily susceptable of resolution by decree. Most require expertise, comprehensive planning, and the commitment of resources, all of which are peculiarly within the province of the legislative and executive branches of government. For all these reasons, courts are ill-equipped to deal with the increasingly urgent The different responses to the double celling question by the lower courts and the Supreme Court in Wo4/fih, mirror the two major approaches to eighth amendment analysis.' 77 The district court found that double celling was a "fundamental deni[al] of decency, privacy, personal security and simply, civilized humanity."' 78 It pointed to other cases which found double celling unconstitutional as evidence that the legal standards of minimum decency had evolved to a point where double ceiling, even in a first-class, facility like MCC, was unconstitutional. ' 79 Similarly, the Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in an opinion by Chief Judge Kaufman, described the lack of privacy in double cells as a "compelling consideration" and added that "the government had simply failed to show any substantial justification for double celling."' 80 Noting that the government had easily eliminated MCC double ceiling in response to the district court's order, the court of appeals held that there was no penological justification for double ceiling pre-trial square feet and contained the same furnishings as the SOCF cells. Id at 541. MCC inmates were confined to their cells for seven-and-a-half hours and for two brief headcounts daily. Otherwise, they were free to move between their cells and common areas, comparable to the SOCF dayrooms. Id Five percent of all MCC inmates spent less than thirty days at the facility and seventy-three percent less than sixty days. Id at 524-25 n.3. Soon after it opened, MCC's population exceeded its capacity and double celling was instituted. Id at 525-26. In contrast, the Supreme Court neither considered double ceiling's effect on any dignity or privacy interests of MCC inmates, nor rigorously scrutinized the rationale for the other MCC practices which the inmates had challenged.' 8 2 It rejected the notion that "there is some sort of'one man, one cell' principle lurking in the due process clause."' 8 3
The Court also warned against federal court activism in prison affairs. While noting that federal courts had rightly condemned "sordid" conditions at some prisons, it added that:
Many of these same courts have, in the name of the constitution, become increasingly enmeshed in the minutiae of prison administration. Judges 182 441 U.S. at 542. The "toothless" scrutiny which the majority employed in upholding all the other challenged practices on security grounds is revealed in Justice Marshall's dissent. He points out that the publishers only rule is unduly restrictive since the number of books allowed per inmate might be limited or MCC could use its electronic and flourscopic detectors to search for contraband. Id. at 572-74. Other institutions had adopted much less restrictive regulations than MCC's concerning receipt of packages by inmates. Id at 574-76. The inmates had a significant interest in the search of their cells because unobserved searches might invite abuse or theft of inmate property by guards and provide an opportunity for contraband to be planted. Id at 576. As to the body cavity searches, Justice Marshall noted that MCC inmates wore one piece jumpsuits which would have to be partially removed before an inmate could insert contraband into a body cavity. Also, contact visits occurred in a glass enclosed room which was continuously monitored and visitors and their packages were searched before entering the visiting area. Id at 576-79. 
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less eliminated any question that the limited role of the courts in prison administration as outlined in Wo6sh is equally applicable in the eighth amendment context. The decisions are complementary in their deference to state penal practices and their unwillingness to incorporate dignity, privacy or decency concerns in their analysis of prison conditions. Read together, the two cases leave little doubt that the Court is pressing for substantially less rigorous federal court scrutiny of state prison conditions.
VI. IMPLICATIONS FOR FUTURE PRISON CONDITIONS LITIGATION: THE STATUS OF THE TOTALITY OF THE CIRCUMSTANCES TEST
Prior to Rhodes, the federal courts used several different "tests" to evaluate prison conditions in eighth amendment cases.""' The two most important standards were the "totality of the circumstances" test and the "minimum necessities" test. As the parties in Rhodes recognized in their briefs, 1 8 9 the Court's treatment of these two tests would be a key feature of its decision. When an inmate makes an eighth amendment challenge to a specific prison practice, a court focuses solely on that particular practice. For example, in Estelle v. Gamble,' 90 the Supreme Court considered only if penal authorities had deliberately denied medical care to the plaintiff.' 9 1 In contrast, in prison conditions cases like Rhodes, inmates challenge a panoply of conditions and practices. 192 When examined individually, each of these factors may not amount to a constitutional violation. A totality of the circumstances test, however, permits a court to analyze the institutional environment as a whole and to conclude that the cumulative impact of prison conditions on inmates constitutes cruel and unusual punishment. The use of the totality of the circumstances test by lower federal courts is closely tied to their willingness to use the eighth amendment to protect "evolving standards of decency" and to scrutinize critically the penological justification for prison conditions. For example, in Pugh v. Locke,' 94 the district court emphasized the standards of decency component of the eighth amendment and linked it to judicial examination of the relation between the conditions in Alabama prisons and the legitimate penological objectives of deterrence, security and rehabilitation. 9 -1 One important corollary of the totality of the circumstances test is that once prison conditions are found to violate the constitution, the remedial power of the court extends to all aspects of prison administration. Federal courts utilizing the totality of conditions approach have consistently ordered comprehensive institutional remedies which have included wide-ranging and detailed improvements in prison facilities, staff and operation. In contrast, the minimum necessities test embodies a much more limited understanding of the eighth amendment and of the oversight role of the courts:
If the State furnishes its prisoners with reasonably adequate food, clothing, shelter, sanitation, medical care, and personal safety, so as to avoid the imposition of cruel and unusual punishment, that ends its obligation under Amendment Eight. The Constitution does not mandate that prisoners, as individuals or as a group, be provided with any and every amenity which some person may think is needed to avoid mental, physical and emotional deterioration. 97 The practical consequences of the difference between the two tests is illustrated by comparing the district court's treatment of prison conditions in Rhodes with the Fourth Circuit's analysis in Crowe v. Leek.' 98 In Crowe, three inmates were confined to a sixty-five square foot cell.' 99 The circuit court found no eighth amendment violation because the prisoners were not physically or mentally abused and were not deprived of the implements of personal hygiene, medical care, exercise or basic sanitation. 200 The district court in Rhodes also found that the essential needs of the inmates were being met. However, by employing a totality of the circumstances test it found five factors which together made double ceiling unconstitutional.
2°1
Rhodes did not explicitly adopt either the totality of circumstances or the minimum necessities test. 20 2 Justice Brennan, in his concurring
VII. CONCLUSION
With Rhodes the Supreme Court avoided a multi-billion dollar controversy with the states and establishing a strong precedent for judicial scrutiny and reshaping of inadequate state institutions. The Court only. employed the two traditional applications of the eighth amendment and failed to consider if long-term double celling offends "evolving standards of decency." Its analysis overlooks both expert opinion that double celling is harmful and the political factors which make it impossible for many states to maintain humane prisons. Rhodes effectively eviscerates the totality of the circumstances test by limiting the eighth amendment inquiry to whether prison conditions currently deny inmates a "minimal civilized measure of life's necessities." Rhodes probably marks the beginning of the end of the judiciary's current role as a "critical force" in ameliorating conditions at state prisons. In some states, it is likely to lead to worsening prison conditions until they reach such a "sordid" level that will even "shock the conscience" of the Burger Court. 
